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1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of product market deregulation on labor markets, with
special emphasis on the Carter/Reagan deregulation of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
There has been quite some interest recently in the impact of product market institu-
tions on labor markets. However, the focus of this literature has been to use di¤erences in
US and European product market regulation to try to explain the divergent performance
of US and European labor markets over the 1980s and 1990s. One obstacle faced by
this literature is that the presence of a multitude of rigidities (and attempts at reform) in
European labor markets makes it di¢ cult to disentangle the roles of product and labor
market institutions in accounting for high European unemployment rates. In contrast,
the US labor market is both highly exible and its institutions were relatively stable
during the period of interest. This allows us to focus only on changes in product market
regulation, while holding labor market institutions constant.
Consider the graph of HP-trend unemployment rates in Figure 1.1 US unemployment
rates began trending downward in the early 1980s, falling from a peak of 7.6% in 1982
to only 5.0% in 2000. The deregulation of US product markets runs parallel to this
decrease in unemployment, as shown by the OECD data on product market regulation
plotted in Figure 1. This, together with the fact that deregulation took place around
the time of the trend reversal in unemployment, makes it worth investigating whether
product market deregulation could explain what has widely been termed the employment
miracle(Krueger and Pischke (1997)).2
Indeed, there is some amount of empirical evidence to support the link between prod-
uct markets and labor markets. At a micro level, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) examine
the impact of French legislation3 which regulated entry into retailing. They nd that
those regions (departements) which restricted entry more strongly experienced slower
rates of job growth. At the cross-country macro level, Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2000), using an OECD index of the degree of product market regulation, also report
a negative relationship between their countrywide regulation measure and employment.
Fonseca, et. al. (2001) show that their index of entry barriers is negatively correlated
with employment and positively correlated with unemployment rates. However, the high
degree of correlation between labor and product market regulation documented in Nico-
letti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000) makes it di¢ cult to disentangle the e¤ects of each
1We emphasize that these are trend unemployment rates, whose business cycle component has been
ltered out.
2At the same time, the major change in US labor market institutions - the 1996 welfare reform - took
place after most of the gains in unemployment had already been realized. Unemployment in 1996 had
already fallen to 5.4%. In fact, one might argue that the immediate transistory e¤ect of welfare reform
should have been to increase unemployment, as welfare recipients were pushed into the labor market.
3Loi Royer of 1974
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type of regulation in a cross-country setup.
The main contributions of this paper are both quantitative and theoretical. Our
main quantitative contribution is to quantify the e¤ect of product market deregulation
on unemployment. We nd that whether product market deregulation is able to account
for the decline in trend US unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s depends crucially
on the method of calibration employed. Using a traditional calibration, along the lines
of Shimer (2005), we nd that increasing product market regulation from 1998 to 1978
levels can account for only a surprisingly small increase in unemployment of less than
two-tenths of a percentage point, from 5.10% in 1998 to 5.26% in 1978. Using a small
surplus calibration similar to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), however, we nd that
decreased product market regulation between 1978 and 1998 can account for the entire
decline in trend unemployment in the United States from 7.2% in 1978 to 5.1 % in 1998.
In addition, we also examine alternative explanations for the drop in unemployment,
namely tax reform and a decline workers bargaining power. We do this by allowing for
both product market deregulation and tax reform or a decline in workers bargaining
power. We nd that our result that product market deregulation is unable to account
for most of the decline in unemployment is robust to the inclusion of both tax reform
and declining workers bargaining power. In order to account for the full 2.1 percentage
point decline in trend unemployment, product markets would need to be deregulated and
labor taxes would have had to decrease from 56.6% in 1978 to 32.0% in 1998. In this
case, the product market deregulation would have accounted for less than one-fth of the
decline in unemployment. Alternatively, product market deregulation combined with a
decline in workers bargaining power from 66.6% in 1978 to 50% in 1998 could generate
the drop in unemployment from 7.2% to 5.1%. However, product market deregulation
only account for only about one-tenth of the drop in unemployment.
On the theoretical side, we specify a dynamic general equilibrium model which com-
bines monopolistic competition in the goods market with unemployment arising from
Mortensen-Pissarides-style matching frictions and individual wage bargaining between
multiple-worker rms and workers. We identify two countervailing channels by which
product market competition a¤ects unemployment: the rst-principles output expan-
sion e¤ect and the overhiring e¤ect. From rst principles, rms with monopoly power
maximize prots by restricting output with respect to its full competition level. As com-
petition increases, prot-maximizing output expands, and along with it the demand for
labor. This in turn implies a greater rate of vacancy creation, which leads to a lower rate
of unemployment. The second channel is the countervailing overhiring e¤ect, which arises
due to the interplay of imperfect competition and individual bargaining in multi-worker
rms.
First, note that the assumption of multiple-worker rms and individual bargaining
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are sensible ones to model changes in product market competition in the US economy.
Under perfect competition in goods markets and constant returns to scale, the number
and size of rms is indeterminate, so the one-worker rm assumption is innocuous. Under
monopolistic competition, however, rm size is determinate, and varies according to the
competition faced by the rm, making a multiple-worker setup preferable. Individual
bargaining is consistent with the employment at willframework which is dominant in
the United States. Under individual bargaining, workers bargain individually with rms,
and rms cannot commit to long-term contracts. In such a setting, rst analyzed by Stole
and Zwiebel (1996, 1996a), the rm may choose to renegotiate the wage at any time with
any worker, e¤ectively making each worker the marginal worker. It is important to note
that such a setup is the natural extension of paying marginal products to a framework
with wage bargaining.
Relatively little previous theoretical work has analyzed whether and how product
market rigidities may a¤ect equilibrium labor market outcomes. Nickell (1999) provides
an insightful overview of early work which is either partial equilibrium or employing some
form of collective bargaining. Recent important contributions are the papers of Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) and Fonseca, et. al. (2001), both of which nd unemployment to
be increasing in the degree of product market regulation. Fonseca, et. al. (2001) focuses
on the impact of entry barriers on the decision to become an entrepreneur or a worker,
nding that entry barriers can indeed lead to lower rates of entrepreneurship and hence
job creation. However, in their setup, those rms which have overcome the entry barriers
then face perfect competition. In contrast, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) study labor
market outcomes in a model with monopolistic competition in the goods market, but
with a more stylized labor market setting. In a similar vein, Spector (2004) studies the
e¤ects of changes in the intensity of product market competition in a model with capital,
and concludes that product market and labor market regulations tend to reinforce one
another. The latter two papers consider static or two-period setups.
In theoretical terms, our paper is most closely related to Stole and Zwiebel (1996,
1996a), Smith (1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) and Cahuc et. al. (2007). Smith (1999)
and Cahuc et. al. (2007) present models with multiple-worker rms and individual bar-
gaining with decreasing returns to scale, which also leads to an overhiring e¤ect. Cahuc
and Wasmer (2001) also show that overhiring is not an issue under perfect competition
and constant returns to scale in production, because marginal revenue product is con-
stant. In addition, using a model without search frictions, Rotemberg (2000) argues that
individual bargaining can lead to wages that are less procyclical than their neoclassical
counterparts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 characterizes short and long run equilibrium, and presents analytic results on
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the impact of product market competition on labor market equilibrium. Section 4 focuses
on quantitative analysis, and examines the ability of product market deregulation, tax
reform and the decline of union bargaining power to account for the decline in US trend
unemployment during the 1980s and 1990s. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
In this section, we present the basic general equilibrium model. Its main elements are
monopolistic competition in the goods market and Mortensen-Pissarides-style matching
frictions in the labor market. Our innovation lies in dening and solving the multi-
worker rms problem under monopolistic competition and individual bargaining. The
householdsproblems are standard. We restrict our analysis to the steady-state.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Monopolistic Competition in the Goods Market
Households are both consumers and workers. As consumers they are risk neutral in the
aggregate consumption good. Agents have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over a continuum of
di¤erentiated goods. We use Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)s formulation, which allows
us to connect demand elasticity  to the number of rms n, while also allowing us to
focus on the direct e¤ects of increased competition on the demand elasticity facing rms.4
Goods demand each period is derived from the households optimization problem:
max

n 
1

Z
c
 1

i;j di
 
 1
(1)
subject to the budget constraint Ij =
Z
ci
Pi
P
di where Ij denotes the real income of
household j and ci;j is household js consumption of good i. In order to focus the
dynamics on the labor market, there is no saving. Thus we obtain aggregate demand for
good i as:
Y Di 
Z
ci;jdj =

Pi
P
 
I
n
(2)
where I 
Z
Ijdj is aggregate real income and P =

1
n
Z
P 1 i
 1
1 
is the inverse
shadow price of wealth, typically interpreted as a price index. Equation (2) is the stan-
dard monopolistic competition demand function with elasticity of substitution among
4A previous version of this paper, Ebell and Haefke (2006), used the standard Dixit-Stiglitz prefer-
ences. The results are nearly indistinguishable.
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di¤erentiated goods given by  . As in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we assume that
 = g (n), g0 > 0 and  > 1 where n is the number of rms in the economy. n is given
in the short run and endogenously determined in the long run.
2.1.2 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by a standard search and matching framework (e.g.
Pissarides (2000)). Unemployed workers u and vacancies v are converted into matches
by a constant returns to scale matching function5 m (u; v) = s  uv1 . Dening labor
market tightness to as   v
u
, the rm meets unemployed workers at rate q () = s ,
while the unemployed workers meet vacancies at rate f () = s1 .
Workers and rms are identical so that all jobs are identical. For each worker, the
value of employment is given by VE, which satises
VE = w (1  L) + 1
1 + r
[V 0U + (1  )V 0E] (3)
where  is the total separation rate, w denotes the per period real wage, VU is the
value of being unemployed in the current period and V 0E and V
0
U are the values of being
employed and unemployed in the next period respectively. L is a labor tax, which is
returned to agents in the form of a lump-sum transfer. Firms and workers may separate
either because the match is destroyed, which occurs with exogenous6 probability e or
because the rm has exited, which occurs with probability . We assume that these two
sources of separation are independent, so that the total separation probability is given
by  = e +  + e. Explicit rm exit is incorporated mainly for quantitative reasons.
If rms were counterfactually innitely lived, then the impact of a given level of entry
costs would be greatly understated, since rms could amortize those entry costs over an
innite lifespan.
The value of unemployment is standard:
VU = b+
1
1 + r
ff ()V 0E + [1  f ()]V 0Ug (4)
where b denotes real benets to unemployment. It will also be useful for the bargaining
to dene the workers surplus VW as the di¤erence between the value function when
5As is quite standard in the literature, s denotes a scaling parameter which serves to bring matching
rates within the [0; 1] interval, while  denotes the elasticity of matches with respect to the number of
unemployed.
6Recently, Koeniger and Prat (2006) have extended our model to allow for endogenous separations
and study e¤ects of ring costs and on the job search.
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employed and when unemployed:
VW = (1  L)w   b+ 1
1 + r
[1    f ()]V 0W (5)
2.2 Multiple-worker Firms
Firms are monopolistically competitive. We abandon the one-worker-per-rm assumption
in favor of a more general framework with multiple-worker rms. Under perfect compe-
tition in goods markets and constant returns to scale, the one-worker rm assumption
is harmless, since the number and size of rms is indeterminate7. Under monopolistic
competition, however, rm size is determinate, and varies according to the demand elas-
ticity  faced by the rm, among others. The only way to vary rm size with a given
technology is to vary the amount of labor employed either on the intensive margin or on
the extensive margin8. Consistent with the long run focus of our paper, we assume that
rms adjust employment by varying the number of workers rather than the number of
hours per worker.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future prots. Firm is state variable is the
number of workers currently employed hi. The rms key decision is the number of
vacancies. Firms open as many vacancies as necessary to hire in expectation the desired
number of workers next period, while taking into account that the real cost to opening a
vacancy is V . The rms problem becomes:
V J (hi) = max
h0i;vi

Pi (yi)
P
yi   w (hi)hi   V vi + 1  
1 + r
V J (h0i)

(6)
subject to
demand function:
Pi (yi)
P
=

yi
1
n
I
  1

(7)
production function: yi = Ahi (8)
transition function: h0i = (1  e)hi + q () vi (9)
wage curve: w (hi) (10)
where the wage curve is the result of individual bargaining as described in section 2.3.1.
The rms problem takes into account that a measure  of rms exits each period.
7This argument is formalized in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001). Smith (1999) examines individual bar-
gaining in a multi-worker rm under perfect competition and decreasing returns to scale, the other case
in which the one-worker-per-rm assumption breaks down.
8In a model with capital, rms could also vary output by varying only the amount of capital employed.
In order to maintain an optimal capital-labor ratio, however, rms would also generally adjust by varying
labor as well.
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The rst order condition states that the marginal value of an additional worker must
equal the cost of searching for him/her, weighted by the probability of rm survival 1 :
V
q ()
1 + r
1   =
V J (h0i)
@h0i
(11)
while the envelope condition gives the value of the marginal worker to the rm:
@V J (hi)
@hi
=
   1

A
Pi (yi)
P
  w (hi)  hi @w
@hi
+ (1  e) V
q ()
(12)
This latter equation will be useful in the treatment of wage bargaining in the following
subsection, as it gives the rms surplus in the bargaining problem.
Combining (11) with the envelope condition and using the denition of demand elas-
ticity   1

= @Pi
@yi
yi
Pi
yields the rms Euler equation for employment:
V
q ()
=
1  
1 + r

   1

A
Pi (y
0
i)
P
  w (h0i)  h0i
@w
@h0i
+ (1  e) V
q (0)

(13)
This Euler equation describes the rms optimal employment decision. The left hand side
represents the cost to hiring the marginal worker, the cost per vacancy V multiplied
by the number of vacancies to hire a worker 1
q()
.9 The right hand side represents the
discounted future benets to hiring the marginal worker. The rst two terms in brackets
are standard, representing the workers marginal revenue product net of wages. The
third term, h0i
@w
@h0i
, reects rmscorrect anticipation that the bargained wage (i.e. the
wage curve) will be a function of the rms employment level hi. In section 2.3 we will
connect this wage bargaining term to the hiring externality. The fourth term in brackets
represents the future savings in hiring costs from having hired the worker today, taking
into account the probability of separation e.
2.3 Wage Bargaining
In this section we describe the wage bargaining, allowing us to generate the wage curve
and complete the description of the rms optimal employment decision. In the neo-
classical framework, workers are paid their marginal products. The natural extension
to a bargaining environment is the individual bargaining setup introduced by Stole and
Zwiebel (1996). The key assumption of the individual bargaining framework is that rms
cannot commit to long-term employment contracts, and may renegotiate wages with
9In a one-worker rm model, 1q() represents the average duration to ll a vacancy. In the multi-worker
rm model, however, q () vi is the number of workers hired by posting vi vacancies. To hire one worker,
then, the rm should post 1q() vacancies.
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each worker at any time, making each worker e¤ectively the marginal worker. The rms
inability to commit is the key characteristic of the employment at will environment
dominant in US labor markets. Also, individual bargaining involves bargaining over
wages only, since an individual worker can only deprive the rm of her own marginal
product, which does not give the worker su¢ cient leverage to negotiate hiring.
We later calibrate to US labor markets, in which employment at willis dominant,
and which are hence better characterized by individual than collective bargaining. In
the time period we consider, between 78% and 90% of private sector workers were not
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, according to CPS data reported in Hirsch
and Macpherson (2003).
2.3.1 Individual Bargaining Solution
Under individual bargaining, the rms outside option is not remaining idle, but rather
producing with one worker less. The key point of the individual bargaining framework
is that each worker is treated as the marginal worker, so that the bargaining problem
becomes:
max
w
 lnVW + (1  ) ln @VJ
@hi
(14)
where  is the workers bargaining power. Substituting the expressions for workers
surplus (5) and rms surplus (12) into the rst order condition of (14) leads to a rst-
order linear di¤erential equation in the wage
(1  L)w (hi) = (1  ) b  1  
1 + r
[1    f ()]V 0W (15)
+ (1  L)

   1

Pi (yi)
P
A  hi @w
@hi
+ (1  e) V
q ()

The di¤erential equation (15) has a standard solution, which is derived in the appendix.
The important assumption made in deriving (16) is that future surplus V 0W is not a
function of current rm-level employment hi or of the current rm-level bargained wage
w (hi). This assumption will be conrmed in the following subsections, as the future
value of workers surplus V 0W will turn out to depend only on aggregate variables.
(1  L)w (hi) = (1  ) b  1  
1 + r
[1    f ()]V 0W (16)
+ (1  L)

   1
   
Pi (yi)
P
A+ (1  e) V
q ()

.
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2.3.2 Labor demand and the wage curve
We can now obtain a closed form for the rms Euler equation (13) by taking the slope
of (16) h0i
@w
@h0i
=  

 1
 A
Pi(yi)
P
to obtain a closed form for the rms Euler equation:
V
q ()
=
1  
1 + r

   1
   A
Pi (y
0
i)
P
  w (h0i) + (1  e) Vq (0)

(17)
Equation (17) can be interpreted as a job creation or as a labor demand expression which
relates the rms wage w (hi) to its employment level hi.
Proposition 1: The wage curve takes the form:
(1  L)w (hi) = (1  ) b+  (1  L)

   1
   
Pi (yi)
P
A+
1
1  V 

(18)
Proof. See the appendix.
The derivation of the wage curve exploits that the value of workers surplus depends
only upon aggregate variables10:
1
1 + r
V 0W =

1  
1
1  
V
q ()
The intuition is that workers surplus derives from the workers threat to leave the rm,
depriving the rm of the workers contribution to prots and imposing hiring costs on
the rm. The hiring costs depend only upon aggregate labor market conditions, as sum-
marized by labor market tightness . The rms optimal employment choice guarantees
that the marginal contribution to prots (the right hand side of (17)) is equal to the cost
of hiring that worker (the left hand side of (17)). This implies that both components of
the workers surplus can be expressed in terms of hiring costs, which depend only upon
the aggregate variable  and parameters.
3 Equilibrium
At this point, we impose steady-state and proceed to nd the equilibrium in three steps11.
First, we nd the rm-level equilibrium, that is, the wage-employment pairs that result
from the interplay of the rms optimal hiring decision and the wage bargaining. The
rms optimal hiring decision involves overhiring due to a hiring externality, which is
described analytically. Next, we nd the short run general equilibrium, which amounts
10See the proof of Proposition 1 for a detailed derivation.
11Note that our framework can easily handle shocks, and we could solve the model by log-linearizing
or by applying a variety of other numerical methods. Since our quantitative analysis focuses on long-run
changes in the competitive environment facing rms, we concentrate on the steady state here.
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to nding the equilibrium degree of labor market tightness  while holding the degree
of competition  facing the rms constant. This will allow us to obtain expressions for
all equilibrium variables as functions of competition . In a nal step, we will introduce
entry costs, which will serve to endogenize the degree of competition  (n) and hence the
number of rms in the economy n. This last equilibrium will be referred to as long-run
equilibrium.
3.1 Firm-level Equilibrium
In this section, we nd the rms optimal employment-wage pair when it takes the ag-
gregate variables (labor market tightness  and competition ) as given.
Denition 1 Firm-level Equilibrium
A rm-level equilibrium is dened as a pair of real wages and rm-level employment hi
which satises both labor demand (17) and the individual bargaining wage curve (18),
taking aggregate variables (; ; I) as given.
This rm-level equilibrium is found at the intersection of steady-state labor demand
(17) and the wage curve (18), as illustrated in Figure 4. Formally, we obtain:
A
Pi (yi)
P
=
   
   1

1
1  L b+

1  
1
1  V  +
1
1  
V
q ()
r + 
1  

(19)
(1  L)w (hi) = b+ 
1  
1
1   (1  L)
V
q ()
[r + + f ()] (20)
Equation (19) expresses rm-level employment implicitly, while equation (20) gives the
rm-level equilibrium wage. Also note that although rm-level equilibrium wages do not
depend explicitly on , they will depend on competition indirectly, via equilibrium labor
market tightness .
3.2 Hiring Externality
The individual bargaining solution presented above displays a hiring externality of the
type rst explored in partial equilibrium by Stole and Zwiebel (1996). To see this, rst
recall that in the standard one-worker rm setup, optimal hiring implies that marginal
(revenue) product is equated to the cost of employing a worker. In our case, however, this
equilibrium relationship is modied by the presence of an overhiring term. Specically,
rearranging the rms Euler equation (17) yields
   1

A
Pi (yi)
P| {z }
MRPi
=
   
| {z }
overhiring factor
w (hi) +
V
q ()
r + 
1  | {z }
wage + hiring cost
(21)
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The overhiring factor  

< 1 expresses the fact that rms optimally hire workers beyond
the point at which employment costs are recouped by marginal product12. Firms are
willing to hire the marginal worker whose MRP does not cover their employment costs,
because hiring more workers when MRP is declining serves to depress wages due to
hi
@w
@hi
< 0. Formally
hi
@w
@hi
=  

   1
   A
Pi (yi)
P
< 0 (22)
From (22), it is easy to see that the hiring externality is increasing in workers bargaining
power  and decreasing in competition . The steeper is MRP, the greater the wage
decline to a marginal increase in the rms employment. The hiring externality disappears
in the perfect competition limit as  !1 or if  = 0.
This is analogous to the overhiring results in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Smith
(1999). In these papers, however, the source of decreasing MRP is not monopoly power
but decreasing returns to scale in production. Also, our nding that overhiring disappears
under perfect competition is in line with the results of Cahuc and Wasmer (2001).
3.3 Short Run General Equilibrium
Now, we determine the short-run general equilibrium, taking as given the degree of com-
petition. In our setting, this is equivalent to pinning down all equilibrium variables as
functions of the degree of competition  (n). This will allow us to determine the im-
pact of increasing competition on equilibrium unemployment and wages. We assume a
continuum of identical rms that are uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
Denition 2 Short-run General Equilibrium
A short-run general equilibrium is dened for given n and parameters
(; b;V ; ; ; ; r; A) as a value of  which:
(i) is a rm-level equilibrium satisfying (19)-(20)
(ii) satises the aggregate resource constraint
I =
nZ
0
Pi (yi)
P
yidi (23)
Due to symmetry, the price ratio becomes unity, (23) reduces to I = nyi and (19)
leads to the short-run equilibrium condition
A =
   
   1

(1  L) b+ r + + f ()
(1  ) (1  ) 
V
q ()

(24)
12This breakdown is due to Cahuc, et. al. (2007).
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The short-run general equilibrium condition (24) is monotonically increasing in , so that
existence of equilibrium is guaranteed if
A >
   
   1 (1  L) b (25)
When the economy approaches full competition as  !1, (25) reduces to the standard
condition A > b that workersproductivity productivity be greater in employment than
in unemployment.
Equation (24) is key, since it relates the degree of competition  to short-run equilib-
rium labor market tightness . Once we have tightness as a function of competition  (),
we can obtain the short-run equilibrium unemployment rate from the Beveridge curve:
u () =

+ f ( ())
(26)
We normalize the number of agents in the economy to unity. We can nd equilibrium
aggregate employment as H () = 1  u (). With H () in hand we can nd aggregate
output and subsequently the equilibrium quantity of good i, and of course short-run
equilibrium employment per rm hi () and price Pi (yi), all in terms of the given degree
of competition.
3.3.1 Comparative Statics I: Varying Competition
The characterization of short-run equilibrium allows us to examine the qualitative im-
pact of varying the degree of competition  on short-term equilibrium unemployment
and wages. We identify two main channels by which an increase in competition a¤ects
employment and unemployment: (1) the rst principles output-expansion channel, which
has been discussed by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and (2) the hiring externality
channel, which is unique to our analysis of product market deregulation. Via the output
expansion channel, increased competition leads to increased employment and decreased
unemployment, while the hiring externality channel works in the opposite direction.
Expanding equation (24) allows us to examine these two channels formally:
A =
   
| {z }
overhiring <1

   1| {z }
output expansion >1

1
1  L b+
r + + f ()
(1  ) (1  ) 
V
q ()

(27)
The output expansion term is simply the markup of the monopolistically competitive
rm 
 1 > 1. The greater is monopoly power, the greater is the markup, and the
smaller is equilibrium tightness  for given technology A. By the Beveridge curve (26),
equilibrium unemployment is decreasing in tightness, so greater monopoly power leads
12
to higher unemployment.
The hiring externality term  

< 1 is the overhiring factor discussed in the previous
subsection. When the overhiring term decreases (if monopoly power or bargaining power
 increase), then equilibrium tightness  increases and unemployment decreases. The
overhiring factor counteracts the output expansion e¤ect.
The combined e¤ect of output expansion and overhiring is given by  
 1 > 1, so that
the net e¤ect of increasing monopoly power (i.e. decreasing ) is to increase unemploy-
ment. Clearly, however, since  
 1 <

 1 , the increase in unemployment is smaller than
it would be in the absence of the overhiring e¤ect. By just how much overhiring dampens
the impact of monopoly power on unemployment is a quantitative question which we will
address in the next section.
This comparative static results for short-term equilibrium is summarized in Lemma
1 and Proposition 2. All proofs are found in the appendix.
Lemma 1: Short-run equilibrium labor market tightness is a strictly increasing func-
tion of demand elasticity .
Proposition 2: In short-run equilibrium:
(i) unemployment is strictly decreasing in competition ,
(ii) wages are strictly increasing in competition .
Proposition 2 also establishes that equilibrium wages are increasing in the degree of
competition. This conclusion is the opposite of that drawn by the literature on wages
and the sharing of monopoly rents (e.g. van Reenen (1996)). The source of the disparity
is that the rent-sharing papers typically look at the partial impact on only one isolated
industry, while we consider broader increases in competition which a¤ect all industries
at once. The general equilibrium e¤ect of greater competition is to increase vacancies
and tightness in all sectors, making it easier for unemployed workers to nd jobs. This
increases the value of the workers reservation utility V U , thereby improving the workers
threat point and increasing his/her wage. In addition, equilibrium match surplus, given
by 
1 
V
q()
r+
1  , is also increasing in competition. The reason is that in equilibrium the
value of the marginal worker is the cost of searching for him/her, which increases with
 and hence with  (see Lemma 1). Hence, equilibrium wages are increasing in the
economywide degree of competition.
The empirical literature is silent on the impact of the economywide degree of com-
petition on wages (or wage shares). To get an idea of whether the wage share might be
increasing in competition (e.g. whether the wage share is decreasing in regulation), we
regress a measure of entry regulation on the wage share for a group of OECD countries,
as illustrated in Figure 313. The correlation is highly negative ( 0:804) and signicant
13The data on labor share is the compensation to GDP ratio taken from Gollin (2002), table 2, column
4. The data on entry regulation is the regulation index of Fonseca, et. al. (2001), table 2, table 4.
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at the 1% level. Although this is only illustrative of the data, it is suggestive that wage
shares might be indeed be increasing in competition in the data. It is also consistent with
the positive wage e¤ect of competition suggested by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
3.3.2 Comparative Statics II: Varying Parameters
Proposition 3 summarizes the impact of varying parameters on short-run equilibrium.
Proposition 3: In short-run equilibrium:
(i) labor market tightness  is decreasing in b, V , r, , and e;
(ii) unemployment is increasing in b, V , r, , and e;
(iii) labor market tightness is decreasing in  and unemployment is increasing in  as
long as  > e where
e  (1  L) b+ Vq() 1(1 )(1 )
h
r++f()
1  + f ()
i
V
q()
1
(1 )(1 )
h
r++f()
(1 ) + f ()
i
The results of parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 are standard for search and match-
ing models. Higher unemployment benets, hiring costs, interest rates and separation
rates all increase unemployment. Part (iii) merits comment. Unemployment increases in
workers bargaining power (as is standard), unless the degree of competition is very low.
The intuition is that when competition is low, higher workers bargaining power strength-
ens the overhiring e¤ect (i.e. increases rmsincentives to hire more workers in the sense
that @
2wi
@hi@
   1
( )2
A
hi
Pi(yi)
P
< 0) so much, that the end result is lower unemployment.
3.4 Long-run General Equilibrium
Now we are ready to endogenize the degree of competition. In the long-run, rms may
enter each industry by paying a real entry cost E and by posting enough vacancies to
hire the steady-state workforce. The details of rm entry and exit are as follows: Each
period a measure  of rms exits, and is replaced by a measure  of new entrants14.
New entrants begin production immediately with their steady-state workforce. Hence,
we assume that entering rms know far enough in advance that they will be entering to
complete all entry formalities. During this (these) pre-entry period(s) rms pay the entry
cost. Because of the constant marginal vacancy posting cost they optimally post enough
vacancies to hire their steady-state workforce immediately15. Entry by rms will continue
14Recently, Felbermayr and Prat (2006) have extended our framework to allow for endogenous rm
entry and exit.
15Note that it is not necessary to take the measure  of pre-entry rms into account in aggregate
income. They do not yet produce, and only incur vacancy costs. Hence the rms prots and vacancy
costs sum to zero.
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until prots net of entry costs have been competed down to zero. Hence, free entry in the
presence of barriers to entry leads to an equilibrium number of rms n, which is dened
implicitly by:
E ( (n
)) + V
hi ( (n
))
q ( ( (n)))
= V J (hi ( (n
))) (28)
The free entry condition states that the entry cost plus initial hiring costs must be amor-
tized by prots over the rms expected lifespan. Since equilibrium prots are decreasing
in competition @V
J
@
< 0, free entry forges a negative link between barriers to entry and
the degree of competition/the number of rms in the economy16.
Entry barriers take two complementary forms, time and pecuniary costs. For 1997
we have detailed data on the number of business days it takes to set up a standardized
OECD rm as reported by Pissarides (2001) and on entry fees as a percentage of per
capita GDP from Djankov, et. al. (2002). We combine the two measures into a single
one by adding up the entry costs as a percentage of monthly per capita GDP and the lost
output of a single rm during the entry delay period. Formally, total barriers to entry
are found as:
E ( (n)) = d  yi + '  I ( (n)) (29)
where d is the regulatory delay in months, yi is rm-level output, ' are entry fees as a
percentage of monthly per capita GDP, and I ( (n)) is aggregate income. Combining
(29) with the free entry condition (28) yields:
d  yi + '  I ( (n)) + V hi ( (n
))
q ( ( (n)))
= V J (hi ( (n
))) (30)
Equation (30) closes the long-run equilibrium. It determines the endogenous number
of rms n and the degree of competition  (n) in long-run equilibrium by dening
a negative relationship between barriers to entry and the degree of competition in the
long-run.
4 Quantitative Results
We are now in a position to calibrate our model and approach our quantitative questions.
We explore two alternative calibrations: a traditional calibration along the lines of Shimer
(2005) and a small surplus calibration similar to that in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
For each calibration we ask: What is the impact of increasing competition on equilibrium
16To forge an explicit link between barriers to entry and the number of rms, one may take two routes.
We follow Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and assume that  is an increasing function of the number
of rms. Alternatively, one may hold  constant, and allow for n rms competing via Cournot in each
industry. In a previous version of this paper, we followed this second setup. Results are very similar to
those of the simpler Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) setup presented here, and are available upon request.
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unemployment and wages? In order to answer the question, we run policy experiments
designed to assess whether the product market deregulation of the late 1970s and early
1980s could account for the subsequent decline in US unemployment during the 1980s
and 1990s. In addition, we examine whether other factors, such as the decline in la-
bor taxation or the waning of union bargaining power could account for the decline in
unemployment. Finally, we go on to quantify the overhiring e¤ect.
4.1 Calibration
Our model period is one month. All parameters for both the traditional and the small
surplus calibration are reported in Table 4. In both cases, we calibrate the model to US
data in 1998.
The majority of parameters is common to both calibrations. We normalize the level
of technology A to unity. Our choice of 4.0% for the annualized real interest rate is
standard. We set the job-nding rate f () to be 0.45 monthly following Shimer (2005),
and target the 1998 HP-trend value for unemployment of 5.1%17 by setting the total
separation rate  = 0:024 monthly, roughly in line with the estimates in Shimer (2004).
We set  = 0:8%, so that the monthly probability that a rm will cease to exist implies an
annual rm survival rate of 90.8%. This matches the average ve-year survival probability
reported by Wagner (1994) and is in line with the four-year survival probabilities reported
in Mata and Portugal (1994), which imply monthly exit rates between 0.6 and 1.4%. We
set workers bargaining power so that  = 0:5018, in line with the estimates of Abowd and
Allain, 1996 and Yashiv, 2001. We let matching elasticity take the value,  = 0:5019, in
the range reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). We also choose q () = 0:238, as
in den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000). Our choices for job-nding and job-lling rates
pin down US equilibrium labor market tightness in 1998 to be  = f()
q()
= 1:89.20 This
value for tightness looks high at rst glance. However, it is necessary to adjust for the
fact that rms open as many vacancies as necessary in order to fulll their hiring needs
in expectation. If we multiply the equilibrium tightness  with the rms matching rate,
we nd a ratio of open jobs to unemployed of 45%, in line with the ndings of Shimer
(2005). We set the scaling parameter of the matching function to satisfy s = f()
1  . In
17We wish to concentrate on the long-run impact of regulation, abstracting from business cycle con-
siderations. Hence, we use the HP-trend value, in which the business cycle component has been ltered
out.
18Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) choose  to match the wage elasticity of productivity. They obtain
a very small value of  = 0:052. We will discuss the impact of such low values of bargaining power on
our results later in the paper.
19In a previous version of the paper, we established that the Hosios condition is a necessary but not a
su¢ cient condition for e¢ ciency in our setup.
20Pinning down the value of  does not fully describe short-run equilibrium, as long as some other
variables or parameters are left free. In our case, these parameters will be V and b.
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both the traditional and small surplus baseline calibrations, we set labor taxes to 32% to
match the 1998 labor wedge reported in Prescott (2002)21. Tax revenues are redistributed
to households in the form of lump-sum transfers. Finally, we need to parameterize the
function relating demand elasticity to the number of rms. In a fully microfounded
formulation of Cournot competition within industries22, the demand elasticity faced by
the rm is given by   n, where n is the number of rms. For this reason, we choose
g (n) = n and normalize  = 1.
4.1.1 Traditional vs Small Surplus Calibration
At this point, we are left with a short-run equilibrium condition (24) which relates the
utility from unemployment b to the vacancy posting costs V . We rst decompose23 total
utility from unemployment b into an unemployment benets component bb and a home
production or leisure component bh, so that b = bb + bh. Next, we choose the benets
component bb = 0:187 so that the net benet replacement rate
bb
w(1 L) = 0:30, in line with
US data. Finally, for the traditional calibration we choose the home production or leisure
component bh = 0:198 so that the models semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect
to benets is equal to 2.0, as estimated by Costain and Reiter (2008). The resulting total
replacement rate b
w(1 L) is 0.62
24.
In the small surplus calibration, targeting a semi-elasticity of benets of 14.0 leads
to a home production component of benets of bh = 0:326 and a total replacement rate
b
w(1 L) = 0:95, as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Hence, the only di¤erence between
the traditional and small surplus calibrations is the home production component of utility
bh and hence the total utility from unemployment b.
4.1.2 Entry Costs
For 1997, we can use the detailed entry cost data reported in Table 1, resulting in entry
costs for the US corresponding to 0.6 months of aggregate per capita income. Djankov,
et. al. (2003) report entry fees of 1.0% of annual per capita income, or 12% of monthly
per capital income. Pissarides (2001) compiles an index for entry delay as the number of
business days it takes (on average) to fulll entry requirements, weighted by the number
of procedures that must be performed. The US entry delay index is 8.6 days, or 0.47
21We also looked at a setting with both a labor tax and a consumption tax, and the results were very
similar.
22cf. Gali and Zilibotti (1994) for such a framework.
23Due to linear utility, of course, only the total utility from unemployment bmatters for our calibration.
The breakdown into benet and home production components will be useful later, however, in the policy
experiments.
24Note that we could also target the total benet replacement rate directly, and report the implied
semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to benets.
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months of lost output, based on 220 business days in a year. Adding the two measures
yields total entry costs equal to 0.59 months of output. In what follows, we will call our
composite measure of entry fees and entry delay costs for 1997 the Djankov/Pissarides
index.
For 1978, such detailed entry cost data is unavailable. However, Nicoletti and Scar-
petta (2003) have compiled an index on product market regulation for a set of 21 countries
whose starting date is 1978 and whose ending date is 1998. These 1978 and 1998 index
values are displayed in the middle columns of Table 2 for the subset of 17 countries for
which both Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001)s panel index for 1978-1998 and the detailed
cross section data for 1997 is available.
In order to estimate US entry costs, we use a triangulation procedure. To estimate
entry costs in 1978, we rst run the following regression:
Djankov/Pissarides1997;i = 0 + 1 Nicoletti/Scarpetta1998;i + "i (31)
The results of the regression are reported in Table 3. We rst note that the correlation
between Nicoletti and Scarpettas index in 1998 and our combined Pissarides/Djankov
index (rst column of Table 2) is very high at 0.77. Hence, both indices seem to be
measuring the same things. The estimate of b is highly signicant, with a t Statistic of
4.7, while the estimate for b is marginally signicant. Next, we use the estimates b and b
to transform the Nicoletti and Scarpetta index value for 1978 into a Djankov/Pissarides-
style index for 1978, by taking
Djankov/Pissarides1978;i = b0 + b1 Nicoletti/Scarpetta1978;i (32)
The results of the projection (32) are displayed in the last column of Table 2. For the
US, the resulting measure of entry costs for 1978 is 5.2 months of per capita output, a
nearly 9-fold increase.
4.1.3 Baseline 1998 Calibrations
The results of the traditional and small surplus baseline calibrations to the US economy
in 1998 are presented in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. The bottom right panel of Figure 5
shows that under the traditional calibration, 1998 US entry cost and prots are equalized
when demand elasticity  is 8.2, which corresponds to a markup of 7.0%25. The bottom
right panel of Figure 6 shows that under the small surplus calibration, the 1998 US long-
run equilibrium implies demand elasticity of 18.8 and a somewhat smaller markup of
25Under individual bargaining, the markup is given by   1 .
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2.8%26.
Figures 5 and 6 also show how unemployment and wages respond to varying degrees
of product market competition. As expected, unemployment is decreasing and real wages
are increasing in competition, where competition is measured as demand elasticity . We
note that the bulk of the impact of monopoly power on wages and unemployment occurs
under very low levels of demand elasticity. This is consistent with the empirical results of
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), who nd that most of the benets to increased competition
come from the entry of the rst three to ve competitors, with very little benets accruing
to further entry.
4.2 Product Market Deregulation and the Labor Market
We now use the model to run a policy experiment, in order to assess to what extent
product market deregulation can account for the decline in U.S. unemployment during
the 80s and 90s. We do this by taking the 1998 US baseline model calibrated above
as a starting point, and then examining the impact of raising entry costs to 1978 levels.
We emphasize that we are interested in matching the unemployment di¤erential from
HP-trend data from which the business cycle component has been ltered out, in line
with our focus on the long-run impact of a change in product market regulation.
To run the experiments, we hold the utility from home production bh xed in 1998
and 1978, and adjust bb so that the benet replacement rate
bb
w(1 L) remains xed at
30%. All other parameters are held xed at their 1998 levels.
Results of the deregulation policy experiment are presented in Tables 5 and 6. In the
traditional calibration, changes in product market regulation can only account for a sur-
prisingly small change in equilibrium unemployment. Raising entry costs nearly nine-fold
to their 1978 levels does lead to a substantial decrease in competition, causing markups
to increase by about 50%, from 7.0% to 10.6%. The resulting increase in unemployment
is very small, however, at less than two-tenths of one percentage point, causing unem-
ployment to rise from 5.10% to 5.26%. In contrast, in the data, trend unemployment
increases from 5.1% in 1998 to 7.2% in 1978, as shown in Figure 1.
Under the small surplus calibration, however, we nd that product market deregu-
lation can account for nearly the entire decrease in unemployment between 1978 and
1998. In particular, raising entry costs to their 1978 levels causes unemployment to rise
from 5.10% to 7.2%, an increase of 2.1 percentage points27. However, the small surplus
calibration is controversial. As emphasized by Costain and Reiter (2008), it involves
counterfactually high benet semi-elasticities. In our case, the benet semi-elasticity is
26The greater degree of equilibrium competition (higher ) and lower markups are due to the smaller
prots in the small surplus calibration.
27Markups increase from 2.8% in 1998 to 6.9% in 1978.
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14.0, while Costain and Reiter (2008)s estimates place it at 2.0. This tension between
the small and large surplus calibration is the same as in the unemployment volatility
puzzle, where a small surplus calibration can explain high unemployment variation over
the business cycle, but a large surplus calibration cannot.
In both calibrations, the quantitative impact of product market deregulation on wages
is modest. Under the traditional calibration, deregulation increases net real wages by
about 3.3%, from 0.602 in 1978 to 0.622 in 1998. Using the small surplus calibration
leads to a slightly larger deregulation induced wage increase of 3.8%, as wages increase
from 0.635 to 0.659.
4.3 Interactions
4.3.1 Labor taxation
Next, we examine the role of tax reform and interactions between product market dereg-
ulation and tax reform in accounting for the decline in unemployment between 1978 and
1998. In order to do this, we increase entry costs to their 1978 levels, and also increase the
labor tax rate L as much as necessary to generate the higher 1978 level of unemployment
of 7.2%.
Results of this experiment are reported in Table 8. In order to generate the entire
1998 to 1978 unemployment di¤erential of u = 2:1%, labor tax rates would have had to
be 56.6% in 1978, compared with 32.0% in 1998. In this case, tax reform would account
for 81.1% of the unemployment di¤erence, while the change in entry costs would only
account for 18.9%.
4.3.2 Workers bargaining power
Now we examine the role of a decline in workers bargaining power over the 1980s and
1990s, and interactions between bargaining power and product market deregulation in
accounting for the 1978-1998 decline in unemployment. Again, we both set entry costs
to their 1978 levels and increase bargaining power as much as necessary to generate the
higher 1978 level of unemployment of 7.2%.
Results of this experiment are reported in Table 9. The combined e¤ect of increased
entry costs and increasing workers bargaining power from 50% to 66.6% would be to
generate a 1978 unemployment rate of 7.2%. In this case, the increase in entry costs
would only account for 10.7% of the unemployment change, while the increase in union
bargaining power would account for 89.3%. From Table 9, one can see that this result is
quite robust to the initial 1998 workers bargaining power assumed.
The results in Table 9 are consistent with the econometric results of Fiori, et. al.
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(2007), who report that employment gains in a panel of OECD countries have been larger
when workersbargaining power was initially high. As we increase the level of bargaining
power, the contribution of product market deregulation in explaining the unemployment
di¤erential increases from 7 to 17%.
4.3.3 Matching e¢ ciency
Finally, we consider an increase in matching e¢ ciency during the 1980s and 1990s, and
interactions between increased matching e¢ ciency and product market deregulation. We
run the experiment by both increasing entry costs to their 1978 levels and allowing match-
ing e¢ ciency to decrease su¢ ciently in 1978 so as to explain the entire 2.1 percentage
point 1978-1998 unemployment di¤erential.
Results of this experiment are reported in Table 10. In order to generate the increase
in unemployment to its 1978 level of 7.2%, matching e¢ ciency in 1978 would need to be
about 50% lower in 1978 than in 1999, taking on a 1978 value of 0.24. In this case, the
increase in entry costs would only account for about 10.1% of the unemployment change,
while an decrease in matching e¢ ciency would account for nearly 90%.
4.4 Quantifying Overhiring
In the policy experiment, we saw that the impact of monopoly power on unemployment
under the traditional calibration was surprisingly small. In order to assess which role
the hiring externality is playing in counteracting the rst principles output expansion
e¤ect of increasing competition, we proceed to quantify the overhiring e¤ect. To this
end, we repeat our deregulation policy experiment while shutting down the overhiring
e¤ect. Formally, this is accomplished by replacing  
 1 =

 1 in equations (18), (19) and
(24)28. This guarantees that rm-level equilibrium equates marginal revenue product and
employment cost (wages plus hiring costs), as would be the case in a standard one-worker
rm matching model. Of course, we also recalibrate the model, using the same targets
as in the baseline traditional calibration. The results are given in Table 7 and Figure 7.
The overhiring e¤ect has essentially no impact on the increase in unemployment which
can be attributed to higher 1978 entry costs. The reason is that although shutting down
overhiring rotates the unemployment curve upwards somewhat, this non-optimal rm
behavior also reduces rms prots29, so that equilibrium demand elasticities are increased
and markups decreased in both 1978 and 1998. Now, moving from 1998 to 1978 increases
markups from 4.9 % to 6.7 %, while in the presence of overhiring markups in 1998 and
1978 were 7.0% and 10.6% respectively. As a result, the decline in unemployment which
28This is equivalent to setting the overhiring factor   = 1.
29Recall that overhiring is optimal in our setting, while setting MRP to employment costs is suboptimal.
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can be attributed to product market deregulation is nearly the same as in the presence
of an overhiring e¤ect.
Alternatively, one can shut down the overhiring e¤ect, and examine the impact on
unemployment of moving from a markup of 7.0% in 1998 (corresponding to a demand
elasticity of 8.2) to a markup of 10.6% in 1978 (corresponding to a demand elasticity of
5.7 in 1978). Now, the impact on unemployment does increase slightly to 0.30 percentage
points, compared to an increase of 0.16 percentage points in the presence of overhiring.
Hence, we conclude that the small impact of deregulation on unemployment under
the traditional calibration does not depend only on the overhiring e¤ect being operative.
4.5 Robustness
We now proceed to check the robustness of our quantitative results. We vary the calibra-
tion targets for the job-nding rates f , for the monthly rate of rm exit , the matching
elasticity , workers bargaining power  and the semi-elasticity of unemployment to
benets ub one-by-one, all in the traditional calibration. We do not vary the targeted
job-lling rate q, as this would only renormalize the model.
The results of the robustness exercises are presented in Tables 11 and 12, both with
and without overhiring. We nd that our choice for all of these parameters is innocuous,
with the exception of the semi-elasticity of unemployment to benets ub . As the semi-
elasticity increases (i.e. as the total replacement rate b
w(1 L) increases), the importance
of deregulation in explaining the 2.1 percentage point unemployment di¤erence between
1978 and 1998 also increases, as we have already seen from our results on the small surplus
calibration.
The interaction between worker bargaining power  and the semi-elasticity of unem-
ployment with respect to benets ub is especially noteworthy and depicted in Figure 9.
For very low worker bargaining power (as assumed in Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008),
ub  30 would be needed to generate the 1978-1998 unemployment di¤erential, while
ub  10 is su¢ cient for  = 0:95.
5 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper has been to study the relationship between product
market regulation and labor market outcomes. Our main contribution is twofold. First,
we develop a dynamic model with imperfect competition and search frictions, which is
well suited for the quantitative analysis of the present paper. Our model contains the
interesting feature that the standard monopoly distortion of underproduction is partially
o¤set by an overhiring incentive, especially when monopoly power is high.
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We then use our model to ask whether the Carter/Reagan deregulation of the late
1970s and early 1980s could account for the subsequent decline in US trend unemployment
rates. Our answer depends crucially on whether we employ a traditional or a small surplus
calibration. Under the traditional calibration, increasing entry costs from their 1998 to
their 1978 levels results in a very small increase in unemployment of less than two-tenths
of one percentage point. Under the small surplus calibration, in contrast, the same
increase in entry costs leads to an increase of 2.1 full percentage points in unemployment,
accounting for the entire di¤erence in HP-trend unemployment between 1978 and 1998.
We also interact product market deregulation with tax reform and a possible decline
in workers bargaining power. We nd that our result that product market deregulation
is unable to account for most of the decline in unemployment is robust to the inclusion of
tax reform and declining workers bargaining power. In order to account for the full 2.1
percentage point decline in trend unemployment, labor taxes would have had to decrease
from 56.6% in 1978 to 32.0% in 1998, or workers bargaining power would have had
to decline from 66.6% in 1978 to 50% in 1998. In either case, the direct contribution
from deregulation remains less than 20% of the entire di¤erential. These theoretical
ndings are in line with the empirical results of Fiori, et. al. (2007), who nd no
signicant employment e¤ect of product market deregulation in countries where labor
market policies are loose. This observation leads us to expect stronger e¤ects for the
more heavily regulated European economies.
Finally, we nd that product market regulation could lead to modest increases in real
wages, providing some support for the political economy arguments in favor of combining
labor and product market reform found in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
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Table 1
Detailed Entry Costs for 1997
Dataset OECD OECD Djankov, et. al.
Country Days Procedures Index Fees
Australia 5 6.5 12.3 2.1 %
Austria 40 10 35.2 45.4 %
Belgium 30 7 25.6 10.0 %
Denmark 5 2 5.6 1.4 %
Finland 30 7 25.6 1.2 %
France 30 16 39.3 19.7 %
Germany 80 10 55.2 8.5 %
Greece 32.5 28 58.7 48.0 %
Ireland 15 15 30.2 11.4 %
Italy 50 25 62.9 24.7 %
Japan 15 14 28.7 11.4 %
Netherlands 60 9 43.7 19.0 %
Portugal 40 10 35.2 31.3 %
Spain 117.5 17 84.5 12.7 %
Sweden 15 7 18.1 2.5 %
UK 5 4 8.6 0.6 %
United States 7.5 3.5 8.6 1.0 %
The Days" column gives the number of business days necessary to start a new
rm, while the Procedurescolumn gives the number of entry procedures which
new rms must complete. The Indexcolumn combines the Daysand Procedures
measures as (days + procedures/(ave procedures/day))/2, so that the indexs units
are days. The rst two columns draw on 1997 from Logotech S.A., as reported
by the OCED [Fostering Entrepreneurship] and by Pissarides (2003). The fourth
column gives Djankov, et. al. (2002)s measure for fees required for entry in 1997,
as a percentage of annual per capita GDP.
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Table 2
Entry Costs in 1978 and 1998
Source ! OECD/Djankov Nicoletti/Scarpetta Nicoletti/Scarpetta Projected
Units ! Months Index Index Months
Country # 1997 1998 1978 1978
Australia 0.8 1.6 4.5 6.1
UK 0.5 1.0 4.3 5.7
United States 0.6 1.4 4.0 5.2
Denmark 0.4 2.9 5.6 8.1
Finland 1.4 2.6 5.6 8.1
Sweden 1.2 2.2 4.5 6.1
Austria 7.1 3.2 5.2 7.3
Belgium 1.3 3.1 5.5 7.9
France 4.2 3.9 6.0 8.8
Germany 3.7 2.4 5.2 7.3
Greece 8.6 5.1 5.7 8.3
Ireland 2.8 4.0 5.7 8.3
Italy 6.0 4.3 5.8 8.4
Japan 2.7 2.9 5.2 7.3
Netherlands 4.4 3.0 5.3 7.5
Portugal 5.4 4.1 5.9 8.6
Spain 5.6 3.2 4.7 6.4
The rst column summarizes the entry costs of Table 1 by adding up the entry
delay (as a fraction of a year) and the fees (as a fraction of annual per capita GDP)
and then converting to months by multiplying by 12 to obtain a composite entry
cost measure for 1997. The second and third columns present the product market
regulation indices reported in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000) for 1998 and 1978.
The correlation between the 1997 entry-cost based gures and the 1998 index is
0.77. The nal column is the result of taking the 1978 index values and projecting
them onto entry costs, using the coe¢ cients from a regression of the 1998 index
values onto 1997 entry costs (reported in Table 3 below). This gives an estimate of
1978 entry costs, denominated in months.
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Table 3
Regression of Entry Costs and Product Market Regulation Index
0 1
Estimated Coe¢ cient -2.09 1.81
Standard Error 1.22 0.39
t-Statistic -1.71 4.70
Adjusted R2 0.57
Multiple R2 0.77
The regression equation is:
Djankov/Pissarides1997;i = 0 + 1Nicoletti/Scarpetta1998;i + "i
Table 4
Calibration to US Data
Calibration Targets Traditional Small Surplus
Trend Unemployment Rate (%) 1998 u 5.10 5.10
Monthly Job Finding Rate f 0.45 0.45
Monthly Job Filling Rate q 0.24 0.24
Net Benet Replacement Rate bb
(1 L)w 0.30 0.30
Semi-elasticity of unemployment/benets ub =
@ lnu
@b
2.0 14.0
Calibrated Parameters
Vacancy Posting Cost V 0.173 0.025
Unemployment Benets bb 0.187 0.198
Utility from Home Production/Leisure bh 0.198 0.428
Total Replacement Rate b
(1 L)w 0.62 0.95
Total Monthly Separation Rate  0.024 0.024
Scale of Matching Function s 0.327 0.327
Directly Observable Parameters
Annual Real Interest Rate (%) r 4.0 4.0
Labor Tax Wedge (%) L 32 32
Monthly Firm Death Probability (%)  0.8 0.8
Entry Cost, 1998, (in months of rms output) E;98 0.6 0.6
Entry Cost, 1978, (in months of rms output) E;78 5.2 5.2
Other Parameters
Worker Bargaining Power  0.5 0.5
Elasticity of Matching Function  0.5 0.5
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Table 5
Baseline Results, Traditional Calibration
E 1998 E 1978
Unemployment (%) u 5.10 5.26
Unemploy. Duration 1
f
2.22 2.30
Vacancy Duration 1
q
4.20 4.07
Tightness  1.89 1.77
Demand Elasticity  8.18 5.72
Markup 1 
 1 6.97 10.60
Net wage (1  L)w 0.622 0.602
Table 6
Baseline Results, Small Surplus Calibration
E 1998 E 1978
Unemployment (%) u 5.10 7.21
Unemploy. Duration 1
f
2.22 3.21
Vacancy Duration 1
q
4.20 2.91
Tightness  1.89 0.91
Demand Elasticity  18.77 8.25
Markup (%) 1 
 1 2.81 6.90
Net wage (1  L)w 0.659 0.635
Table 7
Deregulation without Overhiring
E 1998 E 1978
Unemployment (%) u 5.10 5.25
Unemploy. Duration 1
f
2.22 2.29
Vacancy Duration 1
q
4.20 4.08
Tightness  1.89 1.78
Demand Elasticity  11.17 8.48
Markup (%) 1 
 1 4.92 6.68
Net wage (1  L)w 0.605 0.587
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Table 8
Interactions with Tax Reform
98 = 0:05 98 = 0:30 98 = 0:50 98 = 0:70 98 = 0:95
Tax Rate on Labor in 1978 0.749 0.594 0.566 0.548 0.528
Fraction of u due to Entry Costs: 0.126 0.164 0.189 0.222 0.289
Table 9
Interactions with Worker Bargaining Power
98 = 0:05 98 = 0:30 98 = 0:50 98 = 0:70 98 = 0:95
Worker Bargaining Power in 1978 0.122 0.472 0.666 0.818 0.972
Fraction of u due to Entry Costs: 0.069 0.091 0.107 0.130 0.169
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Table 10
Interactions with Matching E¢ ciency
98 = 0:05 98 = 0:30 98 = 0:50 98 = 0:70 98 = 0:95
Worker Bargaining Power in 1978 0.257 0.243 0.241 0.240 0.242
Fraction of u due to Entry Costs: 0.079 0.091 0.101 0.117 0.164
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Table 11
Robustness to r, , , 
With Overhiring Without Overhiring
Increase in % of 98-78 Increase in % of 98-78
u from 9878 di¤erential u from 9878 di¤erential
r = 0:01 0.12 5.7 0.11 5.3
r = 0:02 0.13 6.3 0.12 5.8
r = 0:03 0.15 6.9 0.13 6.3
r = 0:04 0.16 7.5 0.14 6.9
r = 0:05 0.17 8.1 0.16 7.4
 = 0:000 0.04 2.0 0.04 1.9
 = 0:005 0.11 5.3 0.10 4.9
 = 0:010 0.19 9.0 0.17 8.2
 = 0:015 0.27 13.0 0.25 11.7
 = 0:020 0.37 17.4 0.36 15.6
 = 0:05 0.12 5.5 0.12 5.5
 = 0:30 0.14 6.6 0.13 6.3
 = 0:50 0.16 7.5 0.15 6.9
 = 0:70 0.19 8.9 0.16 7.6
 = 0:95 0.26 12.5 0.21 9.9
 = 0:10 0.15 7.0 0.14 6.6
 = 0:20 0.15 7.1 0.14 6.6
 = 0:30 0.15 7.2 0.14 6.7
 = 0:40 0.15 7.3 0.14 6.8
 = 0:50 0.16 7.5 0.15 6.9
 = 0:60 0.16 7.7 0.15 7.0
 = 0:70 0.17 8.0 0.15 7.2
 = 0:80 0.18 8.6 0.16 7.6
 = 0:90 0.22 10.4 0.18 8.8
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Table 12
Robustness to ub , f
With Overhiring Without Overhiring
Increase in % of 98-78 Increase in % of 98-78
u from 9878 di¤erential u from 9878 di¤erential
ub = 0:5 0.03 1.6 0.03 1.5
ub = 2:0 0.16 7.5 0.15 6.9
ub = 4:0 0.36 16.9 0.32 15.3
ub = 6:0 0.59 28.2 0.53 25.0
ub = 8:0 0.87 41.5 0.76 36.2
ub = 10:0 1.21 57.4 1.04 49.3
f = 0:10 0.13 6.3 0.12 5.8
f = 0:25 0.15 7.0 0.14 6.4
f = 0:40 0.16 7.4 0.14 6.8
f = 0:55 0.16 7.7 0.15 7.1
f = 0:70 0.17 7.9 0.15 7.3
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A Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Solving the Di¤erential Equation
The di¤erential equation to be solved is given by equation (15):
(1  L)w (hi) = (1  ) b  1  
1 + r
[1    f ()]V 0W
+ (1  L)

   1

Pi (yi)
P
A  hi @w
@hi
+ (1  e) V
q ()

Ignoring the constant terms for now, the equation becomes30
w (hi) = 

   1

Pi (yi)
P
A  hi @w
@hi

(33)
Begin by focusing attention on the homogenous equation
w (hi)
hi
+
@w
@hi
= 0 (34)
which has solution
w (hi) = Kh
 1=
i (35)
where K is a constant of integration. Next, assume that K = K (hi) and take the
derivative of both sides of (35) to obtain
@w
@hi
= h
 1=
i
@K
@hi
  1

Kh
 1 

i (36)
Now substitute (36) and (35) into (33) to obtain
@K
@hi
= h
1 

i
   1

Pi (yi)
P
A (37)
where Pi(yi)
P
=

Ahi
1
n
Y
  1

. Integrating (37) yields
K = A

A
1
n
Y
  1
    1

Z
h
1 

  1

i dhi + J
30This solution follows Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2004).
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which has solution
K = A

A
1
n
Y
  1
    1

Z
h
1 

  1

i dhi + J
= A

A
1
n
Y
  1
    1


   h
1

  1

i + J (38)
Finally, substituting (38) back into (35) yields
w (hi) = 
   1
   A
Pi (yi)
P
+ Jh
 1=
i
Assuming that limhi!0 hiw (hi) = 0 pins down the constant J = 0. Adding back the
constant terms gives the solution to the di¤erential equation given by (16).
(1  L)w (hi) = (1  ) b  1  
1 + r
[1    f ()]V 0W
+ (1  L)

   1
   
Pi (yi)
P
A+ (1  e) V
q ()

.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Begin by solving (16) for 1
1+r
[1    q ()]V 0W and substituting back into the
workers surplus equation (5) to obtain
VW =

1   (1  L)

   1
   
Pi (yi)
P
A  w (hi) + (1  e) V
q ()

(39)
Taking ahead one period and using the rms optimality condition (17), one obtains
1
1 + r
V 0W = (1  L)

1  
1
1  
V
q ()
(40)
Using (40) to substitute out for V 0W in (16) yields the wage curve (18)
(1  L)w (hi) = (1  ) b+  (1  L)

   1
   
Pi (yi)
P
A+
1
1  V 

A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: We need to establish that @
@
> 0. Applying the implicit function theorem to
equation (24) gives us:
@
@
=
1  
(   1) (   )
(1  L) b+ r++f()(1 )(1 )  Vq()
V
(1 )(1 )
h
V   (r + ) q0()q()2
i > 0
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where the numerator is clearly positive. The denominator is also positive due to due to
 2 (0; 1),  > 1 by (25) and q0 () < 0 for a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
matching function.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: (i) Di¤erentiating the Beveridge curve (26) with respect to  yields that
@u
@
=   f
0 ()
[+ f ()]2
< 0
since the job-nding rate is increasing in tightness f 0 () > 0 for all constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas matching functions. By Lemma 2, @
@
> 0. Application of the chain
rule yields that @u
@
= @u
@
@
@
< 0.
(ii) Di¤erentiating the equilibrium wage (20) with respect to  yields that
@w
@
=

1  
1  L
1   V

1  (r + ) q
0 ()
q ()2

> 0
where the inequality follows because q0 () < 0 for all CRS Cobb-Douglas matching
functions. By Lemma 2 and the chain rule, we have that @w
@
= @w
@
@
@
> 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) We need to establish that @
@b
, @
@V
, @
@r
, @
@
and @
@e are all negative. In each case we
apply the implicit function theorem to (24), to obtain @
@x
=  @[]=@x
@[]=@ where x is the relevant
parameter, and the derivatives are taken with respect to the right hand side of (24). It
is easy to see that the common denominator @[]
@
> 0 is positive for all constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas matching functions, so it remains to establish that the numerator
@[]
@x
> 0 for all parameters x. We obtain:
@ []
@b
=
   
   1 (1  L) > 0
@ []
@V
=
   
   1

1
(1  ) (1  )

r + 
q ()
+ 

> 0
@ []
@r
=
   
   1
1
(1  ) (1  )
V
q ()
> 0
@ []
@
=
   
   1
V
1  

1
q ()
(1  ) (1  e) + (r + )
(1  )2 + 
1
(1  )2

> 0
@ []
@e =       1 11   Vq () > 0
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where the last two equations make use of the denition of the total separation rate as
 = e+    e.
(ii) @u
@b
, @u
@V
and @u
@r
can be shown to be negative by rst noting that by part (i) @
@x
< 0
where x represents b, V or r. Applying the chain rule and using that @u@ < 0 by Lemma
2 yields @u
@x
= @u
@
@
@x
< 0.
For @u
@e = @u@ @@e + @u@ @@e we obtain
@u
@e = f () (1  )[+ f ()]2 + @u@|{z}
<0
@
@e|{z}
<0
> 0
where the last term uses the results of (i) and of Lemma 2.
For @u
@
= @u
@
@
@
+ @u
@
@
@
we have:
@u
@
=
f () (1  e)
[+ f ()]2
+
@u
@|{z}
<0
@
@|{z}
<0
> 0
where once again the last term uses the results of (i) and of Lemma 2.
(iii) We are interested in the behavior of @
@
and @u
@
. First, obtain an expression for @
@
by once again applying the implicit function theorem to (24) to get @
@
=   @[]=@
@[]=@ where
@ [] =@ > 0 was established in (i). This leaves
@ []
@
=
   
   1
V
q ()

(1  ) (1  ) f () + (1  ) (r + + f ())
(1  )2 (1  )2

  1
   1

(1  L) b+ r + + f ()
(1  ) (1  ) 
V
q ()

The rst term is positive, and on its own would cause @
@
< 0 and @
@u
> 0 as is standard in
matching models. The second negative term is due to the overhiring/monopoly coe¢ cient
 
 1 . In the perfect competition limit, the second negative term approaches zero, so that
@
@
< 0 and @
@u
> 0. For some smaller values of competition it is possible that @[]
@
< 0.
To establish that a critical value for competition e exists for which  > e implies that @[]
@
is positive we look for a condition on  that guarantees that @[]
@
> 0. @[]
@
> 0 whenever
 >
(1  L) b+ Vq() 1(1 )(1 )
h
r++f()
1  + f ()
i
V
q()
1
(1 )(1 )
h
r++f()
(1 ) + f ()
i  e
Hence, when  > e, then @[]
@
> 0, @
@
< 0 and by Lemma 2 @
@u
> 0, as is standard in
matching models.
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Appendix C Figures
Figure 1: Unemployment Rate and Entry Regulation.
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Source: BLS and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
Figure 2: Evolution of U.S. Labor Market Institutions.
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Source: OECD and Jim Costain’s and Michael Reiter’s webpage:
http://www.econ.upf.es/~reiter/webbcui/bcui.html .
36
Figure 3: Entry Regulation and naive Labor Shares.
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.6
0.62
OECD Index of Entry Regulation
Co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
as
 S
ha
re
 o
f G
DP
Correlation: −0.804
p−value: 0.00728
Sweden 
U.S. 
Finland 
U.K. 
Belgium Netherlands 
France 
Portugal 
Italy 
Data on compensation/GDP is taken from Gollin (2002), Table 2, column 4. Data on entry regulation
is the regulation index of Fonseca et al. (2001), table 2, column 4, multiplied by 5 to convert to days.
The negative correlation is highly significant even for the small number of observations. This plot is
merely meant to be an illustration of the data.
Figure 4: Firm Level Equilibrium: Wages and Employment.
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Figure 5: Long Run Equilibrium: Baseline Calibration.
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Figure 6: Long Run Equilibrium: Small Surplus Calibration.
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Figure 7: Quantifying the Overhiring Effect.
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The solid line shows the impact of competition on equilibrium unemployment (or wages). The
dashed line shows how competition affects unemployment (or wages) when the hiring externality
has been shut down by setting σ−βσ = 1.
Figure 8: The Overhiring Effect and Worker Bargaining Power.
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The solid line in each panel shows the impact of competition on equilibrium unemployment. The
dashed lines show how competition affects unemployment when the hiring externality has been shut
down by setting σ−βσ = 1. Throughout this experiment the unemployment elasticity of the matching
function, η, has been kept at it’s baseline value equal to 0.5, i.e. no Hosios condition has been im-
posed.
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Figure 9: Response of Deregulation to u-b semi-elasticity, ξub.
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